Chen Fashu, the legendary investor often dubbed "China's Warren Buffett," has made his first move to trim his stake in Chengdu RML Technology Co., Ltd (301050.SZ) after more than a decade of holding. On September 13, RML disclosed that Chen, the second-largest shareholder with an 8.8549% stake, plans to reduce his holdings by up to 7.4164 million shares, or 2.9956% of total share capital, citing "personal funding needs." Based on the September 11 closing price, the maximum cash-out is approximately 212 million yuan, with the reduction window set between October 13, 2026, and January 12, 2027.
The timing raises eyebrows. RML's shares have plunged over 45% this year, halving from January's peak, making this look like a "floor sale." But flip to the cost side, and the picture reverses dramatically: Chen entered in 2015 when the company was still "RML Limited," and after multiple bonus share conversions, his estimated cost per share is merely 4.44 yuan, versus the current price of around 27 yuan—still six times his initial investment. More tellingly, this marks his first public sale since taking a stake over a decade ago, making RML his longest-held publicly disclosed position.
As of September 16's close, RML was trading at 27.38 yuan per share, up 2.24%, with a total market value of 6.779 billion yuan.
An 11-Year Hold, The Odds Were Already Favorable
The planned reduction of 7.4164 million shares represents roughly one-third of Chen's current holdings. If fully executed, his stake would drop to approximately 14.5064 million shares, or 5.86%, still cementing his status as a major shareholder with over 5% ownership. This is not an exit move; it is a calculated profit-taking exercise. The announcement also emphasized that Chen is neither the controlling shareholder nor the actual controller, and this reduction will not trigger a change in control or materially impact governance or operations.
The cost dynamics are the real twist. After multiple capital reserve conversions diluted his entry price, Chen's estimated cost stands at just 4.44 yuan per share, while the current stock price of around 27 yuan still delivers a roughly six-fold return. His connection with RML began in June 2015 when he injected 67.4 million yuan for 4.4 million yuan of registered capital, followed by a 16.5 million yuan transfer from actual controller Deng Jieru for 1.6 million yuan of registered capital a month later. A year later, he added another 13.5 million yuan for 2.7 million yuan of registered capital. In November 2019, his son-in-law Han Chencheng even joined RML's board. Over two years and three transactions, Chen spent nearly 100 million yuan to acquire roughly 14% of the company's registered capital. When RML listed on the ChiNext board in August 2021 at an issue price of 60.64 yuan per share, his stake diluted to 8.99%, then valued at around 1.4 billion yuan. Thus, the planned 7.4164 million shares, even at "bargain basement" prices, lock in floating gains of nearly 168 million yuan. This is not a stop-loss; it is a trade whose favorable odds were set 11 years ago.
Why sell now after an 11-year hold? Clues emerge from RML's operational performance. The company specializes in millimeter-wave active phased-array microsystems, with core products—T/R modules and array antennas—critical components in radar, communications, and precision guidance. This industry has a persistent trait: order acceptance cycles are long, and earnings fluctuate with downstream procurement rhythms. In its 2026 interim report, RML posted first-half revenue of 68.3324 million yuan, down 85.22% from 462 million yuan a year earlier. Net profit attributable to shareholders swung to a loss of 91.4877 million yuan, versus a profit of 116 million yuan previously, a year-on-year decline of 178.71%. After excluding non-recurring items, losses reached 101 million yuan, down 195.84%. Quarter by quarter, the slide is steeper: Q1 revenue was 64.2657 million yuan with a 54.4966 million yuan loss; Q2 revenue collapsed to just 4.0668 million yuan, a 98.2% year-on-year plunge. Impairments were the other major drag—first-half credit impairment losses totaled 77.4166 million yuan due to delayed R&D project collections and aging receivables, plus 25.7089 million yuan in asset impairment losses from sluggish batch-order deliveries and slower inventory turnover. Together, these 103 million yuan in charges directly eroded profits. Still, the company maintained in its interim report that its fundamentals remain stable, with low leverage, strong debt-servicing capacity, and ample financial cushion to sustain R&D investment, project delivery, and long-term strategy.
RML is not without prospects. In May 2026, it signed a 442.8 million yuan mass-production contract for array antennas, representing 59.8% of 2025's full-year revenue; successful delivery could significantly support this year's and next year's performance. The company is also positioning satellite communications as a second growth curve, with its Chengdu Phase II base already operational since Q1. Market analysts view Chen's sale as a noteworthy signal. For RML, the near-term trajectory hinges on when orders recover, receivable collection improves, and whether T/R modules and array antennas gain real traction in satellite internet and low-altitude aviation scenarios.
From Zijin Mining Legend to Fujian's Richest Man
Born in 1960, Chen Fashu is the founder of New Hua Du Industrial Group and earned his reputation as a "stock god," "super retail investor," and "China's Buffett" long ago. His defining moment came with Zijin Mining, now the cornerstone of his wealth empire. In 1997, while running a department store retail business, Chen was stuck with engineering equipment worth over 60 million yuan that he couldn't resell. Rather than writing it off, he founded New Hua Du Engineering to take on earthwork contracts for Zijin Mining, where he met chairman Chen Jinghe. That equipment, once seen as a burden, became the lever for his future fortune.
In 2000, Zijin Mining launched its shareholding reform. The small state-owned factory under Shanghang County was valued at under 150 million yuan, with total share capital of 95 million shares. At a time when the mining sector was depressed and gold prices were weak, few saw potential. Chen Jinghe's attempts to attract investors in Hong Kong and Shenzhen were rebuffed. Chen Fashu, however, committed 33.59 million yuan in cash through New Hua Du Group and two related entities, taking roughly 20% of the shares to become the second-largest shareholder after the county government. What followed is a repeatedly chronicled wealth story. In December 2003, Zijin Mining listed in Hong Kong, splitting its share par value from 1 yuan to 0.1 yuan. Between 2003 and 2006, the company executed multiple high-ratio bonus issues, multiplying share capital tenfold. In April 2008, Zijin returned to the A-share market, with Chen and the New Hua Du system collectively holding about 2.178 billion shares. At the 7.13 yuan issue price, that was valued at 15.529 billion yuan—an approximately 460-fold return on his 33.59 million yuan investment in just eight years.
The "stock god" title was cemented in 2009. When Chen's restricted shares unlocked on April 27 of that year, he immediately began aggressive selling. In just over six months—from April 27 to November 24—he offloaded roughly 440 million shares through block trades and secondary-market sales, cashing out around 4.2 billion yuan. Over subsequent years, combined with the New Hua Du system, his total cash withdrawals from Zijin exceeded 10 billion yuan. In 2009, Chen ranked 11th on the Forbes China Rich List with 21.85 billion yuan in wealth, topping Fujian Province. That same year, he hired Tang Jun as president of New Hua Du Group for around 1 billion yuan, officially pivoting from industrialist to professional investor.
Shifting Gears After Peak
Post-Zijin, Chen turned his sights to rare consumer and healthcare leaders. In May 2009, he acquired 7% of Tsingtao Brewery for roughly 1.6 billion yuan, later profiting about 1.5 billion Hong Kong dollars through placement sales. That year, he also signed a 2.2 billion yuan agreement to buy 12.32% of Yunnan Baiyao from Hongta Group. The deal stalled on state-asset approval; China National Tobacco Corporation refused to greenlight it over "preventing state asset losses," and Chen lost his lawsuit, recovering only principal and interest. He didn't relent. In 2015, he steadily bought shares through company and personal accounts, becoming Yunnan Baiyao's fourth and eighth-largest shareholders. In 2016, when Yunnan Baiyao launched mixed-ownership reform, New Hua Du Industrial injected 25.37 billion yuan to secure 50% of Baiyao Holdings, standing alongside Yunnan state capital as co-controlling shareholders. In June 2018, Chen became Yunnan Baiyao's chairman; in 2019, he was co-chairman, deeply involved in operations and at one point personally directing the company's securities investments. This pursuit spanned fifteen years.
From 2010 onward, Chen deployed his "contrarian positioning, heavyweight leadership holdings, long-term conviction" playbook, with both textbook wins and the biggest stumble of his investing career. In 2018, as the solar industry faced policy headwinds and LONGi Green Energy shares halved, Chen built positions against the trend and kept adding. By the end of Q2 2022, his position was valued at 11.5 billion yuan, with floating gains possibly reaching 10 billion yuan. In Q1 2020, as China Tourism Group Duty Free shares tumbled, he bought heavily at around 80 yuan per share, then trimmed at highs, pocketing over 2 billion yuan in cash-outs plus gains.
Yunnan Baiyao, however, told a different tale. The company's securities investments earned about 2.3 billion yuan in 2020 on "big white horses" like Xiaomi, Moutai, and Tencent, briefly earning it "stock god" praise. In 2021, the market reversed, and investment gains swung to a 1.6 billion yuan loss; 2022 brought another 520 million yuan loss. Over two years, losses exceeded 2 billion yuan, culminating in a full exit by Q3 2023. On May 26, 2024, Chen and his son Chen Yanhui resigned from Yunnan Baiyao's board, exiting the company he had chased for fifteen years. The company attributed the departure only to "work adjustments." Market estimates suggest cumulative investments of nearly 29 billion yuan, with overall floating losses of about 500 million yuan including dividends, while he also missed out on multiple rallies in Zijin Mining and new energy names. His most dedicated investment yielded the worst return.
Fast forward to 2026, and Chen is on the move again—this time into dairy giant Yili Industrial Group. His Q1 filings show him newly appearing among Yili's top ten shareholders with 60.4381 million shares, valued at about 1.593 billion yuan. He added 2 million shares in Q2, lifting his stake to 62.4381 million shares, then trimmed 1 million shares as of August 26, leaving 61.4381 million shares still worth over 1.6 billion yuan. This fast in-and-out cadence marks a departure from his past style.
Chen's rise—via Zijin Mining and LONGi—was a product of a bygone era, built on nerve, insight, and the courage to make outsized bets. His earlier approach of concentrated, long-term holding—twenty years in Zijin, six in Yunnan Baiyao—delivered both wins and wounds. But the game has changed. Chen's portfolio is now shifting from single-track concentration to a dual-engine structure: consumer blue-chips as ballast, tech-growth names for upside. New Hua Du Industrial Group remains Yunnan Baiyao's second-largest shareholder, with holdings worth approximately 18 billion yuan as of Q2 2026. He also personally holds stakes in RML, Beichuang Technology, Yealink Network, and Sentec. This rhythm shift is precisely what makes the RML sale most intriguing. Some market views suggest that given his long holding period and low cost basis, the current valuation still offers substantial paper gains; this reduction is more about personal capital reallocation than bearishness on the company, especially since he will retain 5.86%—his connection remains intact.
For Chen Fashu, this sale is less a retreat than a "have it both ways" play: securing low-cost chips through long-term patience, locking in partial gains at a key juncture—neither fully exiting nor stubbornly holding. Yet when even a stock god starts cashing out at lower prices, the signal for smaller retail investors may be worth pondering: "China's Buffett" has already taken his first step toward the door.