Shenzhen Everwin Precision Technology Co.,Ltd. (300115) disclosed its 2026 semi-annual report on August 26, showing operating revenue of 10.729 billion yuan, up 24.18% year-on-year, yet net profit attributable to shareholders plummeted 94.20% to just 17.765 million yuan. Deducted non-recurring gains and losses, net profit fell 95.13% to 14.0346 million yuan. Operating cash flow turned sharply negative at -203 million yuan, swinging from a 591 million yuan net inflow in the same period last year, a decline of 134.29%.

The stock market, however, has told a very different story. Over the past two years, the company's share price has climbed from about 9 yuan per share to 25 yuan, a gain exceeding 170%, largely fuelled by hopes surrounding its humanoid robot business, which saw revenue surge 537%. But that segment contributed only 243 million yuan in first-half revenue, less than 2.3% of total sales, a far cry from sustaining the company's narrative. Meanwhile, executives reduced holdings near 45 yuan per share, and just two days later, subscribed to an employee stock ownership plan at a bargain price of 20.56 yuan per share. The controlling shareholder also signalled plans to sell shares worth over 500 million yuan. With the employee plan's performance targets focused solely on revenue growth, ignoring profitability, questions of a "soft deal" are growing louder.

When those with the deepest insight into the company's operations choose to cash out, investors must ask not merely whether the transformation can succeed, but how much further this race of 10-billion-yuan revenue can truly run.

Net profit down 94%; robot business remains a distant hope as operating cash flow turns negative and short-term debt pressure intensifies

Everwin Precision's business is structured around a "dual-pillar consumer electronics and new energy plus artificial intelligence" strategy. Its core operations span three main segments: precision components for smart terminals and electronics (including electronic connectors, precision structural parts and modules applied in laptops, wearables and smartphones), new energy structural parts and connection components (such as power and energy storage battery precision parts, electrical connection modules and charging pile components), and actively developed embodied intelligence and emerging technology hardware (such as humanoid robot precision components, AI server high-speed connectors and liquid cooling products).

In the first half of 2026, Everwin Precision generated revenue of 10.729 billion yuan, up 24.18% year-on-year. The new energy segment led the way with 4.326 billion yuan in revenue, a 47.21% increase, but its gross margin of only 11.85% ranked lowest among the three divisions. Consumer electronics brought in 5.758 billion yuan, up 8.59%, a notable slowdown from the 24.08% growth seen in the prior-year period, while contributing the company's main profits with a 19.46% gross margin. The embodied intelligence business recorded 243 million yuan in revenue, surging 537.64% year-on-year, but represented less than 2.3% of total revenue, still too small to lift overall results.

Although revenue crossed the 10-billion-yuan threshold for the first time in a half-year period, net profit attributable to shareholders was a mere 17.765 million yuan, a staggering 94.20% collapse. Deducted non-recurring items, net profit fell 95.13% to 14.0346 million yuan. What exactly is consuming the company's earnings? The core reasons are threefold. First, operating costs grew faster than revenue, up 27.04% against 24.18% revenue growth, dragging the blended gross margin down 1.87 percentage points to 16.88%. The second quarter alone saw gross margin slide further to 15.35%, pushing the net margin into negative territory at -1.75%. Second, financial expenses ballooned to 228 million yuan, surging roughly 353% year-on-year, largely due to significant exchange losses. Third, investments in new businesses rose sharply, with R&D expenses up 25.05%, and selling and administrative expenses climbing 23.80% and 23.64%, respectively, pushing the total expense ratio to 15.75%.

What deserves more attention than the profit decline is the strain on the company's cash position. In the first half of 2026, net operating cash flow was an outflow of 203 million yuan, versus a 591 million yuan inflow a year ago. The full-year 2025 figure had already fallen to 562 million yuan, a 75.13% drop from 2.228 billion yuan in 2023 and 2.259 billion yuan in 2024. The deterioration stems from growing working capital pressures, with accounts receivable reaching 4.645 billion yuan by mid-2026, up 50.2% year-on-year. Short-term borrowings rose further to 6.088 billion yuan from 5.916 billion yuan at the end of 2025, while the company's cash on hand was just 2.482 billion yuan, leaving it with heavy short-term repayment obligations.

Under such debt pressure, on May 11, 2026, Everwin Precision formally submitted its listing application to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange aimed at a dual "A+H" listing, with proceeds explicitly earmarked in part to "repay some short-term interest-bearing bank loans." The company itself acknowledged in its prospectus the enormous strain of settling short-term debt.

Executives sell high, buy low via employee stock plan; performance targets draw criticism for being too lenient

Despite weak operating performance over the past two years — with 2025 net profit attributable to shareholders down 22.53% year-on-year — the stock has been a standout on the A-share market. The share price climbed from around 9 yuan at the start of 2024 to roughly 25 yuan by July 2026, a gain exceeding 170% over roughly two years, driven primarily by expectations of strong growth in the humanoid robot business.

On December 17, 2025, the company disclosed a reduction plan for five directors and senior executives totaling no more than 382,528 shares (approximately 0.0281% of total share capital), citing "personal funding needs." By the plan's expiry on April 10, 2026, Director and General Manager Chen Xiaoshuo and Chief Financial Officer Zhu Shouli had both sold incentive shares through centralized bidding on January 12, 2026. Chen disposed of 129,000 shares at an average price of 45.2612 yuan per share, representing 0.0095% of total share capital, while Zhu sold 100,000 shares at 45.4458 yuan per share, or 0.0073%. Together, they cut 229,000 shares, just 0.0168% of total share capital (0.0169% excluding treasury shares).

Notably, two days after announcing the reductions, Everwin Precision unveiled its sixth employee stock ownership plan, which included all five of the same executives. The plan's subscription price was set at 20.56 yuan per share, only 60% of the company's average buyback price, while the market price stood around 40 yuan at the time. This gave executives the opportunity to sell at roughly 45 yuan per share and, just days later, buy back shares at a steeply discounted 20.56 yuan, creating a significant price gap widely criticised on the market as "sell high, buy low."

Under the plan's terms, the only company-level performance metric is revenue growth, covering 2026 and 2027. The targets require total revenue to rise at least 18% in 2026 and 28% in 2027 against the 2023-2025 three-year average, allowing 100% vesting. A six-tier vesting schedule from 0% to 100% means even an 11% growth rate would entitle participants to 60% of their shares. However, with 2025 net profit attributable to shareholders down 22.53%, operating cash flow down 75.13%, and deducted non-recurring net profit of just 570 million yuan, the sole focus on top-line growth without any assessment of profitability or cash flow quality effectively lowers the performance bar, sparking market doubts about "watered-down" targets.

Everwin Precision's new energy and robotics strategy is not without ambition — delivering 860,000 robot components and maintaining supply chain ties with Apple and CATL are real achievements — but strategic vision cannot substitute for financial soundness. When operating cash flow has fallen from the 2-billion-yuan level to negative territory, net margins are squeezed below 0.2%, interest-bearing debt nears 10 billion yuan while cash on hand is just 2.3 billion yuan, and insiders continue to exit their positions, the question is no longer "will the transformation succeed" but: with cash flow deteriorating at breakneck speed and persistent insider selling, how much time remains for this transition, and how much genuine commitment exists to share risks with shareholders.